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news accounts and specialized studies. Although certain costs of war can be quantified and validated, the hidden psychological costs of war are inestimable, but real nonetheless.
The Colombian conflict generated a necessity for international cooperation and much more is needed in assistance. In November 2003, international aid had totaled only 1.4 billion dollars, of which 42% was received from the United States. This is a sad indictment of the rest of the world community and is a great detriment because of Colombia's own lack of sufficient internal resources to sustain necessary government policies and programs.
Since the end of the Cold War, many nations around the world have encountered transnational threats. Colombia then is not the only one in facing threats that jeopardize legitimate international business and banking systems and cause untold human suffering. The term "transnational" encompasses a phenomenon that cuts across national borders and one that is not directly controlled by the Colombian government. This includes terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, smuggling of weapons and wide spread environmental degradation.
Terrorist groups in Colombia, like other such groups, export their activities. So they constitute a global threat.
The background to Colombia's conflict is common to many Latin American nations; they evolved as highly stratified societies, divided between traditional rich families of Spanish descent and the vast majority of the poor, thus providing a natural constituency for insurgency.
Violence may have grown out of social and political splits, but drug-trafficking and narcoticsrelated crimes have added to all of the countries, particularly Colombia's, volatile mix. Results of the current violence are more 35,000 people killed over the past decade, which is a cost studied more deeply in this paper.
Transnational organizations in Colombia have accrued the wealth and political power to extend their violence regionally and globally. Colombia's problems have become the world's viii problems. Colombia wants to join the global community in winning the war on terrorism, which unfortunately for Colombia began as a domestic phenomenon. 
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
COSTS OF THE WAR IN COLOMBIA: A STRATEGIC VISION OF THE END OF CONFLICT
ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT
Colombia's bloody period of La Violencia began in 1948, 1 Since the 1980's, the conflict added a new actor and different phenomena. Self defense groups (AUC) were formed by drug-traffickers and landowners to combat insurgent kidnapping and extortion in support of drug cartels. Since then, both guerrillas and self defense groups have gradually eliminated and displaced drug traffickers, obtaining control of most of the illegal trade. Denied Soviet and Cuban financial support, these groups now are funded by income from cocaine and heroin business, which provides approximately half of the groups' annual 1.5 billion dollars income, a resource utilized to intensify their struggle. Another source of income is still nowadays kidnapping for random, representing almost the first income in the annual operational budget.
In the 1990's terrorism entered the scene and gave the illegal armed groups a potent psychological weapon to intimidate the populace. An extended number of atrocities such as kidnappings, murders, massacres, bombings, wholesale destruction of villages, explosions of pipelines, 2 energy towers and storage facilities. All of these were used by terrorists groups to control some regions. By 2002, terrorist groups (FARC -ELN) increased their numbers to nearly 20,000 members and the self defense groups (paramilitary) grew to 12,000. The impact affected security in the country, limiting the authority of the government to sustain control of some portions of the national territory and eroding its economy. The problems of violence and security in Colombia increased because the state lacked the necessary leadership and financial resources to initiate a strategy that addressed the political, economic, military and social dynamics of the conflict. In fact, the state had no comprehensive strategy to win the conflict. Rehabilitation. Specifically, it will not grant the prize of amnesty to leaders of the insurgency, freeing them to resume their dirty work the first opportune moment. To put an end to the war is fundamental. It is a necessary condition for a successful peace process and to rebuild the nation and improve conditions. It will note the recent example of El Salvador, where post-conflict violence (90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) is nearly as intense as the violence of their civil war and almost double the current war time violence in Colombia. Winning the war in Colombia will also mean ending the violence. And winning the peace is often more difficult than winning the war.
EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION
Colombia will make every effort to cut off the money flowing into its terrorist organizations.
These funds purchase weapons and ammunition; they provide salary for personnel. They fund terrorist activities like bribery, blackmail, and bombings. An interdiction of their flow of money would greatly diminish their ability to sustain an armed agenda against the pressure by the legitimate military and would of course hopefully hasten their pursuit of a political solution.
It is important to examine the dispute between the FARC -ELN and the illegal selfdefense groups (see figure 1 ) over coca growing areas. One explanation of this friction is that it is largely caused by the rapid expansion of each one's "territory" and thus the growing cultivation of coca by all parties. drug laboratories were destroyed. 6 Clearly President Uribe's objective of eliminating the drug trade is being quickly and successfully implemented.
YEAR
COSTS OF THE WAR TO THE NATION
Colombia's remarkable economic recovery, with its 9% increase in gross domestic product and with substantial gains in employment, has been an immediate reward from its Democratic Security Policy. Even so, Colombia's foreign debt left over from the Pastrana administration is equal to 52% of the GDP (US $42 billion). To continue to sustain its war, When the terrorists are defeated the Colombian government can compile in one sum and make available for peaceful purposes more than USD $100 million annually to solving many social problems and to develop its economy.
OTHER COSTS OF THE WAR
It is also necessary to consider other costs incurred in the conflict. An analysis of those costs will provide an additional guideline in efforts to provide a solution, one must keep in mind how important it is for Colombians to understand how the conflict started, continues and hopefully, will soon end to ensure that the peace is permanent. reported during the same period in 2,003 a reduction of 39.5%. 10 Colombia is working hard to reduce the terrible humanitarian costs of this war.
HUMANITARIAN COSTS
MATERIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS
The war has severely crippled Colombia's tourism industry. Tourist spending has been lost, and Colombia's image as a scenic, adventurous travel site has been tarnished. In 2,002, Princess Cruise Lines declared Colombia a dangerous place, and 19 tourist cruise visits to Cartagena were cancelled.
As a result of the conflict, unemployment during the last decade has almost reached 20%
in the seven major cities of the nation. Likewise, over 29 million Colombian languish in poverty.
Displacements and injuries from the war contribute to these problems.
Colombia's traditional agribusiness has likewise suffered. In the past decade, 1.7 million hectares of farms and orchards have been abandoned. The costs of unattended soil, lost homes, lost crops, and lost equipment are inestimable. Funds from foreign countries and domestic investments have adversely affected investment during the lasts ten years as a result of narcoterrorism.
These distressing trends were also reversed in 2,003 when the national economy grow by Santiago Montenegro, Director of Dirección Nacional de Planeación (DNP) 11 , proclaimed "The Government goal is to achieve a 3.8% increase in GDP in 2004, but we hope to exceed that goal." Accordingly, buoyed by initial economic success, President Uribe encouraged economic institutions to achieve a 5 % increase in Colombia's GDP for 2004.
Economic sabotage has expanded in the past few years with the aim of expanding the fiscal deficit and preventing the state from maintaining or increasing its military expending.
Infrastructures have been destroyed by terrorist groups. In 2002, 22 bridges were objective of terrorist attacks and their rebuilding will cost more than USD $44 million. 12 The country lost approximately USD $ 470 million as a consequence of attacks against the national infrastructure. Other structures such as energy towers and oil pipelines which suffered terrorist attacks also will have to be reconstructed. Although the studies do not distinguish between combatants or not combatants when they are they in hostilities or not, the human rights principles protect soldiers when they are at rest, leave, vacation, or in prisoner status after combat. Since 1997 at least 225 members of the Armed Forces in civilian clothes unarmed have died. These actions were during break periods, leaves or vacations. The Army has lost only 205 members killed as in defensive situations.
SOCIAL COSTS
The war has left many orphans as well as many women as heads of their families. 
SPIRITUAL COSTS
The spiritual losses are also considerable and include change of values, loss of the sense of life, sentiments of insanity, lost confidence in anyone and all places, desperation in a war that doesn't permit one to escape, vengeance, abhorrence of society, and mourning after the dead of relatives and friends. These are very heavy emotional and spiritual losses of catastrophic dimensions where many people feel lost and abandoned.
THE STRATEGIC WEAKNESS OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS IN COLOMBIA
The Colombian's abhorrence of the war between government forces and the various narcoterrorists groups, which has been raging throughout the country for more than forty years and has created a long period of instability, has reached its peak! The time of the "heroic 
IMPACT OF THE GOVERNMENT STRATEGY
According to this analysis, if the FARC came out of its hidden places to engage they would find a military force much different than 1998. Another important result has been the construction of secure jails and a restructuring of the INPEC (National Jail system). 22 The jails now are not rest areas or brief vacations for the captured terrorist.
The FARC organization has lost a number of combatants as well as high and middle level commanders, which are more difficult to replace. The terrorists have lost territorial control. Its attempt to urbanize the conflict resulted in some terrorist acts which had not broken the will of Colombia and its resolution to eliminate them. If the FARC continue with their strategic withdrawal, this will be very costly for it and its membership. Past experience indicates that recovery of lost territories is not an easy task. The Government little by little is recovering Arauca, Meta, Putumayo, Caquetá and Guaviare, zones highly dominated by terrorist groups.
inhospitable and less strategically important.
Colombia, with strong support from the United States , basically eliminated the narcotic cartels in the mid 1990's. The leaders were captured and prosecuted. But this phenomenon has not affected the high unemployment rate and the superficial economy created by the drug renaissance an increasing coca production. Now Colombia is the world's leader in coca growth and in the supply of cocaine to world markets.
Initially, U.S. aid to Colombia was directed only to the detection and suppression of narcotics and not to counter-insurgency operations. The Colombian Army could not utilize this aid, particularly the UH-1N and UH-60L helicopters, in their struggle against FARC-ELN or the United Self-Defense Groups. Subsequently, the U.S. realized the true dangers of the terrorist guerrilla groups and that there was little difference between them and the narcotic traffickers.
Restrictions on the use of U.S. aid have now been largely lifted.
Neighboring countries have criticized the plan as they envision the war in Colombia spreading across their borders, but they do not realize that during 40 years of conflict this enemy is no more a political armed insurgency or a largely communist organization that sought control of the government. As they grew in strength and capability in a symbiotic relationship with narcotics traffickers they increased their presence in the international drug trade and also became a transnational movement somewhat integrated with inactive and passive 
CONCLUSION
The Colombian problem is essentially political or cultural and the use of the military instrument alone therefore insufficient. Popular, plausible theories signal economic disparities, political inequities and cultural anachronism as the root causes of conflict.
There are many quantified costs; others are very difficult to measure in the actual circumstances of the country. But future generations will remember all that Colombians paid for, with many mistakes along the way. It built a society more tolerant, creative and just. No compensation to the people could be accepted as valid in view of the destruction caused by the terrorists even after President Uribe had extended his hands as a signal to all groups and offered a new opportunity to the dissidents to be reinstated in society.
The Colombian government, with U.S. assistance, has already accomplished a great deal to reverse the country's decline -much of it attributed to violence fuelled by the drug trade. It has prepared conditions for an eventual, negotiated settlement with the armed illegal groups.
The danger is necessary to analyze, the progress won for the state and society only could be lost if the political support of the terrorist make people convinced that Colombia must adopt a pacifist and conciliatory policy again.
The international community, including of course the United States, must understand how important the success of Plan Colombia is for the actual survival of the nation and possibly that of the region. Colombia has achieved numerous successful results and continued progress in its battle against narco-terrorism.
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